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The consequences are examined of the revision of Guyana's Mining Act in 1989 that was intended to
allow access to international mining companies while safeguarding national interests. One outcomewas
the acquisition of over 75% of small-scale and over 40% of medium-scale concessions by a small number
of nationals. Landlordism expanded following the spike in the international gold price from 2006. The
State’s failure to modify the poorly construed mining law, and to enforce the Regulations, enables the
continued capture of the excess rent from gold sales by rentierswithout commensurate responsibility for
them to remedy the environmental degradation. Evidence of ﬁnancial losses to the State from the renting
of concessions and the smuggling of gold is presented. The legal protections of Indigenous Peoples are not
enforced. The legal protections of mining workers are inadequate. We recommend: making the mining
licence holder legally responsible for ensuring compliance with all Regulations on every concession; the
implementation of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) to safeguard Indigenous rights in both titled
and customary territories; the capture of excess rent from gold sales for a sovereignwealth fund; and full
transparency so as to end insider trading in concessions.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
This article examines two inter-related themes in Guyana’s gold
mining sector: the consequences that follow from concentrated
holdings and ‘landlordism’ of State property and from the State’s
weak administration of the sector. We suggest that one explana-
tion for the minimal uptake of recommendations for sectoral
reform contained in the reports of consultants and others is
directly related to regulatory capture (Dal Bó, 2006).1 This review
of tenure arrangements in the goldmining sector complements our
research into rentier practices in the forestry sector and the
concentration into the hands of a few loggers of both logging
concessions and the log trade (Bulkan, 2014a;[324_TD$DIFF] Bulkan and Palmer,
2008; Palmer and Bulkan, 2010).
This article draws on the data contained in a Management and
Systems Review of the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission
(GGMC) commissioned by Guyana’s Ministry of Natural Resources),
regulatory agency which is
s dominated by the vested
hat it oversees.
Ltd. This is an open access articleand the Environment (MNRE) in 2014 and led byGrantleyWalrond,
a former GGMC Commissioner (Walrond et al., 2015). The Review
was leaked to the Press which highlighted some of its ﬁndings
(Stabroek News, 2015, 7 April). The disclosures led to a full-page ad
hominem attack on the consultants by the GGMC in the form of a
paid advertisement (Kaieteur News, 2015,10 April). However, none
of the Review’s ﬁndings was refuted then or later. We examine
brieﬂy some of the social and economic consequences of the high-
level crony corruption and lay out some policy prescriptions for
sectoral reform.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a general
overview of the geopolitical and institutional context of Guyana’s
public lands, including the legal safeguards for the rights of
Indigenous Peoples. In Section 3 we brieﬂy review recent literature
on mining issues. In Section 4, we summarize mining administra-
tion, law and policy, including the main criteria for eligibility for
large-, medium- and small-scale concessions. In Section 5 we
assess the requirements for obtaining and retaining concessions in
lawand in practice. Section 6 tracks the growth in number and area
of concession licences over time and Section 7 assesses the
evidence relating to concession administration. Section 8 consid-
ers some of the charges of corruption levelled at concession
procedures and practices. In Section 9, we discuss the evidence of
landlordism and State support of or acquiescence in the status quo.under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
2 The terms ‘African’, ‘Amerindian’, ‘East Indian’, and ‘Mixed’ are both the legal
terms used in the decennial censuses and the self-ascriptions with widest social
acceptance. In the main the nine surviving Indigenous Peoples of Guyana use the
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to gold exports, internal declarations and the contribution of gold
mining to GDP during 1990–2014. In Section 11 we present and
discuss three examples of ﬁnancial losses to the State from the
illegalities in the sector. Section 12 concludes with policy
recommendations for reform.
2. General overview of Guyana’s geopolitical and institutional
context
Gold and diamond mining are carried out in Guyana’s
hinterland that comprises 95 per cent of its land area (GLSC,
2013, p. 21). Over 80 per cent of the country’s land area are public
lands administered by the State and divided into three categories:
State Forests (60 per cent), State Lands (23 per cent) and Protected
Areas (5 per cent), each administered by a semi-autonomous
commission (Guyana Forestry Commission and INDUFOR, 2013, p.
5). A Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MNRE)
was created in 2012 to oversee the ﬁve natural resources
commissions (Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Guyana
Forestry Commission (GFC), Guyana Geology and Mines Commis-
sion (GGMC), Guyana Lands and Surveys Commission (GLSC) and
the Protected Areas Commission). The commissions combine
regulatory and law-enforcement functions; each has the authority
to receive area fees and in the case of the Forestry and Mining
Commissions, to receive royalties and to levy penalties. Six Mining
Districts are overlaid on State Forests (and some State Lands) and
administered by the GGMC.
Mineral exploration and mining concessions overlap with State
Forest Exploratory Permits and logging concessions issued by the
GFC on public lands. On paper the State’s territorial monopoly
suggests that integrated land use planning (ILUP) to rationalize
spatial and temporal allocations to natural resources extraction
would be feasible via inter-agency collaboration. In practice,
however, ILUPwas consistently ignored in favour ofMinisterial and
Cabinet discretionary practices. An itemization of the wide
discretionary powers accorded to the Minister in the Mining Act
(cap. 65:01 of 1989) covers 15 pages of Walrond et al.’s report
(2015, Appendix A, p. 1–16).
In the aftermath of the ﬁrst free-and-fair national elections in
1992 there were a number of donor-funded projects aimed at
operationalizing ILUP. One notable project was the ‘Guyana
Integrated Natural Resources Information Service’ (GINRIS) proj-
ect, set up with German government funding in 1994 for
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) equipment and training
of staff of the land commissions with the intention to implement
the national policy favouring ILUP. A second project was the Carter
Center-funded National Development Strategy (NDS), whose
chapter on Mining remains relevant in 2016 (Government of
Guyana, 1996 [343_TD$DIFF]a,b, 2000). The ruling Peoples Progressive Party (PPP,
1992–2015) disregarded both GINRIS and the NDS. The former was
dismantled when German aid ended after a pilot ILUP exercisewas
tested successfully in (administrative) Region 10 in 1997.
After its formation in 2012, the Ministry of Natural Resources
and the Environment (MNRE) commissioned an external consul-
tancy ﬁrm to draft its Strategic Plan (Strategic Environmental
Advice, 2013). In tandem, a second consulting ﬁrm, HTSPE,
developed a new version of a national land use plan (GLSC,
2013). However up to the time a new government was declared in
May 2015, two years later, no action was taken to revive a national
ILUP process to rationalize overlapping land uses on public lands.
Consequently the natural resources Commissions continued to
issue separate concessions on the same land area, using separate
GIS systems software and with little coordination at headquarters
or in the ﬁeld.Mining is regulated under the Mining Act that was revised in
1989 in a period of IMF-supervised reform of a failing State-
controlled public sector. In his assessment of the ‘processes of
enclosure’ that sought to link the Guyanese belowground
resources to international investment capital and metropolitan
centres of gold mining, Gavin Bridge noted the global trend
towards expansion of mining access without a commensurate
increase in State regulation:
‘In the ten year period beginning in 1985, over ninety states
adopted new mining laws or revised existing legal codes in an
effort to promote foreign investment in their mining sector. The
promulgation of new Mining Codes was frequently part of a
broader package of neoliberal administrative and legal reforms.
Their combined effect was to open up new opportunities for the
international mining industry in areas that were formerly either
closed de jure because of political restrictions, or closed de facto
since political-economic riskwas sufﬁciently high to deter prudent
investment’ (2007, p. 75).
Themineral-rich areas are coincident with the customary lands
of Guyana’s Indigenous Peoples, referred to as ‘Amerindians’ since
at least the Crown Land Ordinances and Regulations from 1861.2
Amerindians number around 80,000 and are the majority
populations of the hinterland. 97 of the approximately 138
Amerindian communities hold communal legal title only to
aboveground resources on 14 per cent of national territory through
the Amerindian Acts of 1976 and 2006. The legal and equitable
adequacies of the land titling and demarcation processes for
Amerindians are frequently disputed (Dooley and Grifﬁths, 2014;
APA, 2015). For example, Amerindian property rights are burdened
by the State’s reservation of the right to issue mining concessions
on ‘any part of Village lands; any land contiguous with Village
lands; or any rivers, creeks or waterways which pass through
Village land or any lands contiguous with Village lands’ (Section 53
(a–c)) provided that ‘the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission
shall ﬁrst (i) notify the Village and (ii) satisfy itself that the impact
of mining on the Villagewill not be harmful’ (Amerindian Act 2006,
Section 53(i–ii)).
Gold mining on communally titled Amerindian Village Land
(AVL) is regulated under Sections 48–53 of the Amerindian Act
2006. Any small or medium scale mining activities require ‘good
faith’ negotiations with the Village Council (Section 48(1)(e)), and
‘the consent of at least two-thirds of those present and entitled to
vote at a Village general meeting’ (Section 48(1)(g)). If a mining
agreement is reached, ‘the miner, his employees and agents shall
comply with the rules made by the Village Council’ (Sections 14(1)
and 49(2)(e)). Thus, although the GGMC can issue mining
concessions over titled AVLs, a Village can veto small- and
medium-scale concessions (Section 48). No such veto is allowed
to owners of other private property through Section 7 of theMining
Act 1989. In practice, mining takes place in and around AVLs and
untitled communities, with or without the consent and participa-
tion of the Amerindians themselves (Bulkan, 2014b; Bulkan, in
Press). GINRIS exercises in the 1990s showed that a majority of
State Forests, State Lands and proposed Protected Areas overlapped
with the claimed customary lands of Indigenous Peoples
(conﬁrmed by the former GTZ project manager, pers comm
2006; Colchester et al., 2002; map on page 105). A program of
Amerindian CommunityMine Rangerswas instituted as part of the
GGMC’s ﬁeld monitoring. Walrond et al. reported that there weresame term ‘Amerindian’ to describe their generic ethnic grouping.
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for action were ignored by the GGMC (2015, p. 44).
The Mining Regulations associated with the Mining Acts since
1931 were concerned with keeping waterways open for navigation
(Regulation 57 and State Lands Act, Section 22) and water sources
clean for drinking (Regulation 108). Not until the Environmental
Protection Act 1996 was there a legal concern about negative
environmental impacts, but even then only in general terms
(section 11 and schedule 4, item 9). Speciﬁcs for environmental
controls on mining were introduced in the Mining Regulations
2005 but the website of the MNRE was still happy to display
pictures in 2014 of chains of ﬂooded abandoned mining pits with
no rehabilitation of any kind, a reﬂection of the general disregard
for restoration of devastated areas. Even after the Omai Gold Mine
Ltd. disaster in 1995 when 1.2 billion litres of cyanide slurry spilled
into the Essequibo River, astonishingly the Government ‘allowed
[the company] to forgomandated land reclamation’ (Lowe, 2014, p.
10).
The two largest donor-funded environmental projects targeted
at the gold mining sector were Canada’s CIDA GENCAPD project
(1998–2005) and WWF Guianas Program projects including its
‘Goldmining Pollution Abatement Project’ (2008–2016). Neither
bilateral donors nor the Big International NGOs (BINGOs) with
long-term programmes in Guyana – WWF and Conservation
International – investigated the practices that enabled opaque
concession allocations, concentrated concession holdings and
landlordism. Their reports sidestep issues of governance and
corruption but recount no success stories or even indicators of
progress (CI et al., 2013; Lowe, 2006, 2013, 2014).
3. Literature review
Published accounts of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM)
can be grouped into three general categories: the ﬁrst ethno-
graphic and place-based, the second from rights-based and legal
perspectives and the third more focused on national environmen-
tal law and policy and their (non)implementation. In the ﬁrst
category are the ﬁrst-person accounts of opportunistic Amerindian
ASM included in a collection by Forte3 andMelville (1989). Articles
on mining and the Karinya/Carib (Forte, 1990, 1999; Whiteman,
2004) and on Amerindians in general (Forte 1996, 1997, 1998)
detail the upheavals that followed for Amerindian societies,
territories and economies in the wake of ‘gold shouts’.4 Ethno-
graphic descriptions of the complex relationships among pork-
knockers,5 Amerindian gold and diamond miners and Brazilian
garimpeiros (miners) in the Pakaraima mountains homeland of the
Patamona Amerindians during the years 1993-4 and 1997 are
recorded in Roopnaraine’s writings (1995, 1996, 1996/7; Trotz and
Roopnaraine, 2009). Roopnaraine also detailed the distinct roles
and ‘interests’ represented in mining camps.
The second category of literature focus onmining on Indigenous
customary lands and is written from human rights and legal
perspectives. These include the publications of the Amerindian
Peoples Association (APA), the leading Amerindian NGO, and their
partners (Colchester 1997; Colchester et al., 2002). Bulkan (2009,
2011, 2012, 2014a,b,c) and Harvard Law School (2007) examine
these issues from a legal perspective. Common themes in this
category are the serial disregard by State agencies of Indigenous
rights to ‘quiet enjoyment’ (Article 111 of the Mining Act 1989) on
their titled and customary lands and the persistent ignorance4 A gold shout is informal but widely distributed news about a gold ﬁnd or gold
strike.
5 A porkknocker is an itinerant coastlander prospector for gold and diamonds
using labour intensive methods and rudimentary equipment.displayed by the judiciary of Indigenous rights under Guyanese and
international law and common law traditions.
In the third category are the published works of international
academic researchers, which reﬂect some autonomy and attention
to the power dynamics that link the political directorate to
powerful entrenched mining interests (Bridge, 2007; Hilson and
Vieira, 2007; Clifford, 2011). None disentangles the variety of
stakeholders lumped under the generic term ‘miner’ which serves
to obscure the loci of power. A recent paper by Laing (2015) equates
correlationwith causation as he attempts to credit the Ponzi REDD
+ scheme in Guyana (Bulkan, 2014b) and the uncertainty following
the 2011 national elections with a reduction in the number of
mining claims. Brieﬂy, Laing deﬂects attention from the lowannual
Claim Licence fee by presenting only the Guyana dollar amount –G
$1000 for 11ha (notmentioning its equivalence to<US$5) (2015, p.
252). Nor does he investigate (a) the surging international gold
prices during the past 15 years from an average of US$271 in 2001
to US$1668 in 2012 that stimulate gold mining carried out via a
labyrinthine collection of rentier practices or (b) the (ab)use of
rentees’ failure to locate gold which likely account for the non-
renewal at the end of a calendar year of some non-performing
concessions.
The third category includes Lomarsh Roopnarine’s desk
analyses of some environmental policies and practices, initiated
and funded by international partners (Roopnarine, 2000, 2002,
2006). Roopnarine pays little attention to the webs of power in the
gold mining industry that effectively nullify the environmental
best practices that exist only on paper. His initial assessment was
that ‘during the last tenyears or so Guyana hasmade an impressive
start in [policy formulation]’ (Roopnarine, 2000, p. 209). Two years
later he was less sanguine, concluding that ‘Guyana's environ-
mental policy is laggard and ad hoc, lumbering on a continuum
from uncertainty to dissension. Regulatory bodies are running
years behind . . . ’ (Roopnarine, 2002, p. 83). Roopnarine’s 2006
article concludes with nine recommendations advocating even
more exercise of top-down governmental authority in the
command and control mode, without analysing the Government’s
lack of interest in reform nor even acknowledging its systematic
abandonment of successive integrated land use planning pro-
grammes (p. 60–61).
4. Spatial scales of mining
Guyana’s Mining Act 1989 restricted small- and medium-scale
concessions to Guyanese nationals and allowed joint ventures. The
intention was to protect the interests of the technologically- and
ﬁnancially-limited national sector. Perversely, as we show below,
that safeguard facilitated the rapid expansion in ‘evergreen’ (or de
facto perpetually renewable) concession holdings by a small clique
of domestic investors who then set the terms of rentier trans-
actions with foreign joint venture partners or with Guyanese
rentees or ‘tributors’.
The GGMC issues three scales of mining concessions by area –
small-, medium- and large scale (Table 1). After the closure of the
large-scaleOmai GoldMines operation in 2005, therewas no large-
scale mining operation until the commissioning of Guyana
Goldﬁelds Inc.’s hard rock operation in September 2015 (Stabroek
News, 2015, September 16). The distinction between small- and
medium scale exists only on paper. In practiceWalrond et al. found
that a small number of concession holders/rentiers monopolized
concession holdings, both in number and area. Moreover, the same
hydraulic mining methods are used in both concession types. A
2007 Harvard Law School study noted that ‘According to Jack
Morgan, then one of the most senior executives of the GGMC, the
methods employed in medium scale mining are similar to those of
Table 1
Main criteria of large-, medium- and small-scale mining concessions.
Large scale Medium scale Small scale River location
Size of claim 500 to 12,800 acres (202–5,180ha) 150 to 1200 acres (61–486ha) 1500 feet long by 800 feet wide (27.5 acres)
(11ha)
no longer than one mile of
navigable river
Topographic
description
on
application
required required not required not required
No. of claims
per person/
company
unrestricted unrestricted unrestricted unrestricted
License type Prospecting Licence to prospect on a
property (up to 3 years). Mining
Licence to mine on a property (valid
for 20 years)
Prospecting Permit to prospect and
mine on a property. Mining Permit
to mine on a property.
Prospecting Permit to locate a claim. Claim
Licence to mine on a property. Mining
Privilege to be on or to work a claim owned
by someone else.
Prospecting Permit to locate a
river claim. River Location
License to work claim.
Nationality of
ownership
open (100% foreign owner allowed) Guyanese only (joint-venture with
foreigners allowed)
Guyanese only (joint-venture with
foreigners allowed)
Guyanese only (joint-venture
with foreigners allowed)
Renewal Prospecting Licence for 2 terms of
1 year. Mining Licence for terms up
to 7 years.
Prospecting Permit annually.
Mining Permit every 5 years.
Claim Licence at the end of each calendar
year.
At the end of each calendar
year
Proof of
ﬁnancial and
technical
capability
required not required not required not required
Lodging of
performance
bond
required not required not required not required
Submission of
progress
reports
required not required not required not required
Marketing Gold could be exported directly
from site
Gold must be sold to the Guyana
Gold Board (GGB) or to authorized
buyers
Gold must be sold to the GGB or to
authorized buyers
Gold must be sold to the GGB
or to authorized buyers
Environmental
obligations
Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) and Environmental
Management Plan (EMP) must be
submitted.
Environmental Management
Agreement must be signed. Legal
requirement for environmental
permit not enforced.
Environmental guidelines and advisories.
Legal requirement for environmental
permit not enforced.
Environmental guidelines and
advisories. Legal requirement
for environmental permit not
enforced.
Sources: Environmental Protection Act, 1996; Lowe 2006, p. 34–35.
6 See also a statement attributed to the Chief Executive Ofﬁcer of the Indigenous
Peoples Commission, Autry Haynes, that ‘for small and medium scale mining, an
Environmental Impact Assessment is not required’ (Stabroek News 23 March 2013,
“’Our last refuge’ – Kako battling to protect river from miners”).
7 This report was prepared for the GGMC under the Canadian-funded GENCAPD
(Guyana Environmental Capacity Development Mining Project).
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12, note 76).
Yet, at the GGMC’s headquarters, small- and medium-scale
concessions are administered by separate administrative divisions:
Mines Division for small scale claims, prospecting permits and
mining permits while the Land Management Division administers
medium and large scale prospecting permits and mining permits.
Walrond et al. concluded that ‘there is no obvious rationale or
justiﬁcation for this separation which only leads to unnecessary
duplication, slothfulness in titles management and unnecessary
turf conﬂict. The skill set and physical requirements necessary for
the maintenance of the registry for the titles in the different scales
are relatively similar’ (Walrond et al., 2015, p. 5). However, a
parallel system provides more space for opacity, corruption and
discretionary practices at more levels.
Each mining worker is required to have a Mining Privilege, a
certiﬁcate which grants the holder the legal authority to work in a
Mining District and dates back to the AmendedMining Regulations
of 1905 (Josiah 2011, p. 50). The ‘Mines Clerical’ division of the
GGMC issues Mining Privileges (Walrond et al., 2015, p. 41).
The GGMC and EPA do not consistently apply either mining or
environmental protection legislation. In terms of environmental
obligations, Section 11(1) and schedule 4 item 9 of the
Environmental Protection Act (cap. 20:05, 1996) specify that all
mining activities need an Environmental Permit because they ‘may
signiﬁcantly affect the environment’ and hence require Environ-
mental Impact Assessments (EIAs). No exceptions are allowed. In
practice, this explicit requirement is ignored, reputedly because of
an administrative exception made by the then Prime Minister in
his capacity of responsibility for mining in 1997, possibly in thebelief that the power to exempt in section 133 of the Mining Act
overrode the Environmental Protection Act, which contains no such
Ministerial power of exemption. This renders the environmental
mining regulations (2005) ineffective.6
5. Obtaining mining concessions
Before locating a physical small- or medium scale claim, a
prospecting permit (small scale), which costs c. US $2.50 and is
valid for one year, must be purchased from the GGMC head or
district ofﬁce or a Mines Ofﬁcer. In the case of a small scale
operation, once a physical claim has been located, on land or
stretch of river, all four corners (in the case of a land claim)must be
marked with claim boards that state the name of the claim holder,
the date of location, the prospecting permit number and the name
of the creek, ﬂat or hill where the claim is located. Next the GGMC
must be informed within 60days and a notice of location must be
completed and signed, and an application made for a claim licence
which is the actual permission to mine for gold on a small scale.
‘The claimwill not be considered to be valid until there has been an
on the ground veriﬁcation by the GGMC’ (HerMajesty the Queen in
Right of Guyana, 2012, p. 16).7
Table 2
Concession scales, no. and kind of mining licences (2007–2014).
Year/Total area
allocated for mining
Total area
under licences
Large scale Medium scale Small scale
202 to 5180ha 61 to 486ha 11ha
1990 80,000ha
1994 1.2Mha (3
million acres)
50 applicants
1996 2.2Mha >50 new
1997 >3Mha
2007 13 prospecting licences, 10 mining licences 3594 prospecting permits, 373 mining
permits
10,563 claim licences
(116,193ha), 65 prospecting
permits
2008 13.4Mha (33.3
million acres)
9.2Mha (68.5%) (22.9 million acres); 13
prospecting licences, 10 mining licences
4.1Mha (30.4%) (10.1 million acres); 5413
prospecting permits, 550 mining permits
12,582 claim licences
(138,402ha), 107 prospecting
permits
2009 121 prospecting licences 6287 prospecting permits
2010 136 prospecting licences, 7 mining licences 4879 prospecting permits, 742 mining
permits
14,335 claim licences
(157,685ha)
2011 191 prospecting licences, 8 mining licences 5560 prospecting permits, 1074 mining
permits
15,032 claim licences
(165,352ha)
2014 149 prospecting licences, 15 mining licences 7615 prospecting permits, 2904 mining
permits
Note: the peculiar numbers of hectares are due to the original data being expressed in feet and acres.
Sources: Bridge 2007; Colchester,1997; Colchester et al., 2002; [319_TD$DIFF]GGMC2008, p. 7; Harvard LawSchool, 2007; HerMajesty the Queen in Right of Guyana, 20122009ﬁgures from
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada 2012, p. 11; 2007 and 2008 ﬁgures from Thomas, 2009, p. 5; 2010 and 2011 ﬁgures from GGMC 2011, p. 15; 2014 ﬁgures from [320_TD$DIFF]
Walrond et al., 2015, p. 26).
Table 3
No. of registered river dredges.8
Year No. of registered dredges
2001 927
2002 1022
2003 1092
2004 1188
2005 1503
2006 1617
2007 1794
2008 2072
2010 3102
2011 1524
2012 1803
2013 1203
Sources: Lowe 2006, p. 14; GGMC 2008, p. 10; GGMC 2011, p. 15; GGMC 2012, p. 33;
CI et ?al., 2013, p. 9.
8 ‘The judicial system is generally perceived to be slow and ineffective in
nforcing contracts or resolving disputes. Perceptions of corruption and long delays
ake the courts an unattractive option for settling investment or contractual
isputes, particularly for foreign investors unfamiliar with Guyana’ (US Department
680 J. Bulkan, J. Palmer / The Extractive Industries and Society 3 (2016) 676–689At the medium scale, the applicant for a mining permit should
fulﬁl additional requirements: supplying proof of ‘an Environmen-
tal Management Agreement . . . an approved mercury retort . . .
a closure plan, a contingency and emergency plan and lodge an
environmental bond’ (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Guyana,
2012). A prospective large scale operator ‘will have to submit a
technical and economic feasibility study, a mine plan and an
environmental plan’ (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Guyana,
2012). Noteworthy is the absence from the two lists of the EPA
requirement for an Environmental Permit even though the EPA as
primary law takes precedence over GGMC’s Regulations (see
Section 2).
6. Spatial coverage of three scales of concessions – change over
time
GGMC maps show that medium- and small-scale mining
concessions are laid out side-by-side in rectangular blocks over
large areas, regardless of topography, sometimes remote from
mapped or likely mineralization. It is not clear how the potentially
gold-bearing areas in State Lands and State Forests have been
segmented by GGMC into the three area categories. The 2008 data
indicate that the lion’s share by area was reserved for large-scale
prospecting: 13.4Mha or 97.5% of available mining lands were
alienated under large- (69%), medium- (30%) and small scale (<1%)
prospecting permits or claim licences (Table 2) (GGMC, 2008, p. 7).
Since the liberalization ushered in by the 1989 Mining Act,
concessions have been held as speculative investments because
they are cheap to acquire and cheap to retain: ‘the number of new
claims more than doubled from 1316 in 1988–3,070 in 1991. This
was a period in which gold prices actually fell, suggesting that the
increase in claim activity in Guyana was driven more by the
liberalization ofmining legislation (which facilitated the process of
making claims) than by international price trends’ (Bridge, 2007 [325_TD$DIFF]).
Between 2011 and 2014, as the international gold price rose,
medium-scale mining permits almost tripled and small-scale
claim licences also increased (Table 2). As noted (Table 1), joint
ventures with non-Guyanese individuals or companies are
permitted at the medium- and small-scales. There are no
restrictions on the nationality of holders of large scale prospecting
and mining licences.Table 3 lists the registered river dredges between 2008 and
2013. In 2005 there were an estimated 9000 unregistered dredges
operating in the interior, while only 1500were registered (Harvard
Law School, 2007, p. 32).
7. Retaining licences according to mining law and in practice
In law, small- and medium scale mining concession holders
enjoy time-limited and circumscribed rights to demarcated areas
of public lands. In practice, they exercise the following rights
customarily associated with private (freehold) property: ‘a right to
use and manage the property; to derive income from renting it to
others; . . . and to operate without a term limiting the possession
of these rights’ (Weaver, 2006, p. 49). Concessions at small- and
medium scales cannot be transferred by private sale to other
concession holders (Section 58(2) of the Mining Act). Large-scale
concession licences can be sold with prior agreement of the GGMC
(Section 28 of the Mining Act).e
m
d
of State, 2013).
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grant these [medium scale] Permits if it deems the holder
incapable of assuming the obligations of the performance in this
scheme (lack of capacity), or to prevent renewals for the same
reasons or non-performance, this system is operating much like
the [small scale] claim system, where there is an “automatic”
expectation of allocation, or retention regardless of capacity or
effort’ (Walrond et al., 2015, p. 35).
Concession licences are cheap, are renewed automatically, and
are concentrated in a small number of individuals. Table 1 sets out
the conditions for retention of mining concessions. Claim Licences
at the small- and Prospecting Permits at the medium scale have to
be renewed at the end of each calendar year; andmining permits at
the medium scale every ﬁve years. Table 4 shows that licence fees
are nominal. There is no limit on the number of licences that can be
held by one miner or mining company. In practice, concession
renewal is automatic regardless of whether the concession holder
is engaged in mining or not.
As almost all the area allocated for mining at the small and
medium scales is held under concession licences, the only option
available to most current or prospective miners is to negotiate a
contract as a ‘tributor’ on a concession held by landlords. A tributor
or tenant is ‘one who works in a contract agreement with a claim
owner for a percentage of the mineral output. The relationship
between the claimholder and tenants is governed by private
contract’ (Lowe, 2006, p. 9). Tributors paid an annual fee on each
piece of mining equipment in addition to the tribute. The landlord
also endorsed the Mining Privileges of each worker attached to the
tributor (Stabroek News, 2015, 14 June). The unsatisﬁed demand is
demonstrated by the fact that the Land Management Division
‘receives 200–250 new applications for medium scale properties
on a monthly basis’ (Walrond et al., 2015, p. 6).
Monopolised land holdings in forestry and mining are linked to
low concession fees. As Grut et al. noted in relation to logging
concessions in West and Central Africa, ‘forest concessions are
commonly allocated at minimal fees, with the result that large
areas are sought and acquired, the forest is treated as a “free good”,
held for speculation, and exploited rather than managed’ (Grut
et al., 1991, p. 2).
Walrond et al. computed that in 2013 or 2014 the 50 individuals
or enterprises with the largest numbers of mining claims held 82
per cent of the area under small-scale claims (12,279 out of a total
of over 15,000 claims, covering an area of 135,069ha) (Walrond
et al., 2015, p. 91). One person held over 1500 claims. Likewise, forTable 4
Ofﬁcial fees for prospecting and mining permits.
Mineral property, licence type $/acre/annum
Prospecting Licence (large scale) US $0.50 for ﬁrs
US $0.60 for seco
US $1.00 for thir
US $1.50 for four
US $2.00 for ﬁfth
US $3.00 for ove
Mining Licence (large scale) US $5.00 (foreign
US $3.00 (local o
Prospecting Permit (medium scale) US $0.25 for ﬁrs
US $0.35 for seco
US $0.45 for thir
Thereafter, an ad
Prospecting Permit (small scale) G $500 (US$2.5)
Mining Permit (medium scale) US $1
Claim Licence (small scale) to mine for gold and precious stones G $1000 (US$5)
River location licence (presumably per mile) G $2000 (US$10)
Source: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada 2012, p. 112.medium-scale mining permits, 38 persons held 45 per cent (3422
of all Prospecting Permits Medium Scale (PPMS)) and the 24
entities with the most permits held 42 per cent (1222 out of a total
of 2904) (2015, p. 92). The then GGMC Head admitted the land
hunger among prospective claim holders:
‘GGMC Head Rickford Vieira highlighted that the root cause of
some of the disorders can be linked to competition for available
working lands. He said that this is supported by the evidence of
3550 new applications for land claims, 949 new river claims,
and 3236 new mining privileges which were issued’ (Stabroek
News, 2015, 7 February).
Astonishingly some concession holders were allowed to renew
their concessions even though the annual fee was in arrears
(Walrond et al., 2015, p. 30. Press accounts in early 2016
conﬁrmed Walrond et al.’s ﬁnding of near-monopoly control by
a few persons over the area allocated for small and medium-scale
concessions (Guyana Chronicle, 2016; Gaskin, 2016). The extent of
the concentration of State-issued mining properties in a few
hands is alleged to be even higher given the practice whereby
concessions controlled by one person are often held in someone
else’s name.
Unsurprisingly, Walrond et al. found that raiding or unlicensed
mining was ‘a huge problem’ [on account of] ‘corruption, data
entry . . . also “sloppy” with coordinates that plot in the wrong
place . . . Some Mines Ofﬁcers do not appear to be familiar with
the best methods of researching the validity of a claim even
though there is a SOP [standard operating procedure] to train
ofﬁcers. Issues that are critical include the dates when claims
were located and veriﬁed, whether they were relocated, and the
dates when larger scale permits were applied for. Often older
maps for veriﬁed claims cannot be located, or are inaccurate’
(Walrond et al., 2015, p. 43).
Walrond et al. noted the intent of mining law and policy was
‘beneﬁcial occupation’ and equity in access for small-scale miners.
In their view:
‘It was never and could not be the intention of the framers of the
mining laws for one artisan/small miner to own over 1000
claims . . . By deﬁnition, the small-scale miner is assumed to
have his operations limited to mining with tools, which have
the ability to move less than 200m3 of earth, including
overburden in any given day. Similarly, the overarching
consideration is that he cannot explore vast tracks of land
with his limited resources and if he must operate in thisUS$/ha/annum
t year 0.20
nd year 0.24
d year 0.40
th year 0.61
year 0.81
r 5 years 1.21
ownership) 2.02
wnership) 1.21
t year 0.10
nd year 0.14
d year 0.18
ditional US $0.10 per acre for each successive additional year
9 The highest annual production in that ﬁrst periodwas of 139,000 ounces of gold
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acceptable levels. If he is unsuccessful, then he can relinquish it
and move elsewhere or pay the small price of the rental for not
allowing someone else the opportunity towork on that ground.
In a practical sense, there must be a limit to claim holding and
20 claims (500 acres) would be on the generous side for
persons wishing to engage in the small-scale scheme of mining’
(Walrond et al., 2015, p. 35).
8. ‘The pervasive perception of corruption’
The growth of authoritarian government from the attainment of
independence from colonial rule in 1966 has weakened the
intended system of checks and balances in public administration.
Until the change of government in May 2015, the State paid scant
interest to the market value of gold, the wasting resource whose
exploitation brought ﬁnancial wealth to a few but at a high cost to
the hinterland ecosystems and communities and to the workers at
the bottom of the value chain. The rentiers were interested in the
‘cut’ which they could top-slice from the mining workers and
mining operations that did the actual work. Rentier ‘owners’
negotiated deals with sub-contractors (some foreign, others local)
without any involvement of the State, the owner of mining lands.
The government made no attempt to establish a sovereign wealth
fund from mining taxes or to enforce Mining Regulations. Instead
some rentiers maintain private armed enforcers, and their extra-
legal actions were immune on account of their power or Party
political connections. Some of the large concession holders
reputedly practised a rough form of frontier justice, contributing
to the climate of fear in their concessions (pers. comm.). The
upshot was the de facto privatization of public lands and the
socialization of the environmental and human costs of gold
mining.
The management and systems review of the GGMC carried out
in late 2014 noted in several places ‘the pervasive perception of
corruption, perceived lack of transparency and a low public image
of the Commission’ (Walrond et al., 2015, p. 2). The aforementioned
discretionary power held by the Minister (see Section 2) appeared
to have been (ab)used by ‘the granting of speciﬁc requests for
Closed Areas . . . not always the subject of clear and transparent
justiﬁcation’ and by not cancelling certain Mining Permits even
though the low rental fees were not being paid for them (Walrond
et al., 2015, p. 30).
‘Closed Areas’ refer to lands hitherto held under large-scale
Prospecting Licences that are progressively released by the
concession holder into the public resource available for re-
allocation. A ‘Closed Areas Committee’ had been formed in 1994
to advise the Minister on the apportionment of these released
areas among the different scales of mining. This Committee was
effectively defunct between 2005 and 2014, replaced by Ministe-
rial discretion (Kaieteur News, 2014, January 29). When revived in
2014, the Committee was chaired by the Chair of the GGMC Board,
an individual implicated in acquiring mining concessions through
insider trading (Goolsarran, 2015).
Perhaps because of the shortage of other investment and
employment prospects in Guyana, and the cultural importance of
bush life especially for young male African Guyanese, at times of
relatively high gold prices there are far more people seeking access
to land for mining than the numbers of available mining claim
(licences). Thus it is a seller’s market from the point of view of
rentiers. By the 1990s, rentiers alone determined who could be a
rentee and the rate of rent or ‘tribute’. Almost all obligations on the
holder of a mining claim can be passed on to the sub-contractor.
The importance of goldmining inheres in its generation of jobs and
foreign exchange. The State which is the de jure owner of mininglands continued to treat landlordism as normative by issuing
‘certiﬁcates of registration’ and ‘mining privileges’ to the estimated
>8000 active miners, mostly tributors or rentees on concessions
held by GGDMA members (GGMC, 2012, p. 16).
The system was protected by the lack of administrative
oversight, cronyism and an inefﬁcient judicial system: ‘The current
laws . . . allow properties to be challenged. However, challenging
a property is onerous and time consuming, and may not be worth
the effort. In any case, this is not themodus operandi of the current
community’ (Walrond et al., 2015, p. 29).9
Another key issue is the adversarial race relations that
permeate all aspects of political, economic and social life, including
in the mining sector (Bulkan, 2014b). A study of patterns of tenure
insecurity in Guyana noted, ‘a more general reality needs to be
recognized, namely that in Guyana, politics, economics, ethnicity
and access to land are all entangled to form a complex and often
volatile mix’ (Lemel, 2001, p. 3). As explained below, the former
East Indian-dominated Government did not succeed in exerting
total control over the majority African, Portuguese and Mixed
members of the GGDMA. The Government circumvented the
power of the GGDMA to some degree by allocating mining
concessions to its supporters and supporting new associations. As
Walrond et al. explained:
‘Strong complaints have been received related to handling of
prospecting licences (PL) renewals as well as PL applications
with respect to multiple minerals . . . One issue is that
directives can come from higher in the chain. Some public
concern occurs with respect to the way recently small parts of
a PL have been transferred to a Medium Scale Mining Licence,
allowing mining without the ofﬁcial requirements of an EIS
(Environmental Impact Study) and a mineral agreement. Two
speciﬁc examples are known (Mahdia Gold and Eagle
Mountain). At what level this is authorised is a question’
(2015, p. 20).
The resulting concentration in ownership of public property
mirrored the situation in the forestry sector; both beneﬁtted from
State cronyism (Bulkan, 2014a). A forensic audit of the GuyanaGold
Board in 2015 conﬁrmed the practice of automatic concession
renewal for the politically favoured, not linked to evidence of gold
production, payment of annual licence fees or compliance with
environmental obligations (Stabroek News, 2016b, April 28).
9. Landlords, tributors and the normalisation of illegalities
The terms ‘landlord’ and ‘landlordism’ appear frequently in
reports and articles on mining in Guyana and describe what has
become a normative practice on the coast and hinterland  the
private renting of publicly owned resources. ‘Landlordism . . . has
a long history in Guyana, ﬁrst appearing in mid 1890s when large
local investors began to desert the industry in the face of tougher
mining laws’ (Lowe, 2006, p. 12). Arguably landlordism goes back
toDutch timeswhenplantation owners andmanagers did not go to
the forest to cut trees themselves but commissioned free (formerly
enslaved) Africans to harvest trees and towork the land grants and
leases secured by the plantocracy. The rentier practice in mining is
acknowledged in the Mining Regulations (1972, part XVI,
regulations 143–156) although the practice appears to be contra-
dicted by sections 62 (2) (a) and 63 (3) (a) in theMining Act (1989):
‘the Commission shall not grant a mining permit or claim licence –
(a) if it has reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant does
not intend to carry on, in good faith, within the limits of hisin 1894.
10 The CI et al. ﬁgure for registered dredges is 12,039. Both CI and WWF have
conﬁrmed that this is a typographical mistake, repeated in the various drafts (pers
comm).
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claim’.
The GGDMA which represents concession holders only has
successfully resisted any changes in policies or procedures that
sought to cap the number of concessions that could be held by one
person or company or end the practice of automatic renewal of
concessions annually. The Mining Regulations (1972) concerning
lessees and tributors (contractors and their workers) do not
impose any technical obligations on either the rentier or the
contractor, and afford no security of tenure to the contractor.
The GGMC’s presence in the mining areas was and remains
minimal. In 2007, ‘11 Mines Ofﬁcers [were] employed . . . [at a]
monthly wage of US $270 . . . [the] value of one ounce of gold
ranged between US $400 and US $575 (Harvard Law School, p. v).
Unsurprisingly, at that time there was “a standard bribe of one
ounce of gold to get a mines ofﬁcer to ignore a tailings dumping
problem (Harvard Law School, p. 13). Seven years later, Walrond
et al. inferred that GGMC monitoring had not increased:
‘Interestingly, the supplies and ﬁeld expenses as a percentage of
the total expenditure has been steadily reducing (except ﬁeld
expenses 2014) suggesting that the extent of ﬁeld activity has
reduced, or that the cost of doing ﬁeldwork has reduced . . . the
former better reﬂects reality . . . ” (Harvard Law School, 2007, p. 3).
By 2012, the number of ﬁeld ofﬁcers had increased to about 38
(GGMC, 2012).
The GGMC’s performance as a regulatory agency was rated as
poor (Waldron et al., 2015). State inaction gave the rentiers a free
hand: contractors were used in effect as prospectors, and then
ejected by the rentier landlord if signiﬁcant gold were found
(Thomas, 2009, p. 19). There was consequently no incentive for the
contractor to engage in environmentally or socially responsible
mining.
In the period after 1989 and particularly after 2007 when the
price of gold began to climb, the mostly African Guyanese men
could only gain access to mining lands as workers for claim/permit
holders or as tributors. In 2006, Lowe estimated that ‘80% ofmining
occurs through arrangements whereby miners take positions on
someone else's claim. Claim owners would traditionally charge
their tenants (or tributors) a tribute of 10% of gold won on the
property. As these arrangements are private and followno industry
standard, the size of the tribute can vary from case to case’ (p. 12).
There is no ofﬁcial recording of such arrangements and no
requirement to do so in the successive Mining Acts. Brazilian
miners dispersed across the three Guianas allegedly were willing
to pay higher rates of tribute, perhaps linked to the charge that
they exported a large proportion of mined gold illegally back to
Brazil through the porous border, thereby not paying State taxes
and royalties. ‘The GGMC estimates that there are over 1000
Brazilians in the industry . . . 17% of persons employed in small
and medium scale gold and diamond mining . . . 17% of dredges
are owned by Brazilians’ (Lowe, 2006, p. 11).
There is very little disaggregated data in the only two annual
reports  2011 and 2012–submitted in recent years by the GGMC
to the National Assembly (GGMC, 2011, 2012). The 2011 Annual
Report recorded that ‘1767 persons held “Certiﬁcates of
Registration” and 6572 held Mining Privileges’ (GGMC, 2011, p.
16). Regulations 161, 163 and 167 of the Principal Regulations of
the Mining Act 1989 address the issue of maintaining a record of
all labourers with a lawful right to be present in a Mining District.
Regulation 167 speciﬁes that ‘The Registering Ofﬁcer shall keep a
record of the names, ages, residence, places and terms of
employment and proposed wages of persons registered and of
such other particulars as the Minister may direct’. Yet, by the
GGMC’s own admission, only a quarter of mining labourers
held ‘Certiﬁcates of Registration’ (1767 of 6572 persons holding
Mining Privileges)  further evidence of the lack of oversight oflandlord-tributor relations by the regulatory agency in the Mining
Districts.
Only a small percentage of prospective gold workers have
secured contractual employment with the few reputable gold
mining companies that offer regular salaries, beneﬁts and
insurance. For most, the precariousness of their livelihoods is
part of the story of gold mining in Guyana, in which the labourers
who take the most risk earn the smallest share. Safe work
regulations exist only on paper and some sub-contractors of the
concession holders take risks that result in fatalities. The past
Government’s lack of interest in enforcing regulations meant that
the numbers of deaths in mining pit cave-ins and related tragedies
might be reported in the Press or not at all.10 deaths in 2014 and by
August 2015, at least 14 deaths had been recorded, with two lives
lost on 1 and 2 September 2015. Following the deaths of 10 miners
in May 2015, the Press repeatedly called for more active
involvement of the Ministry of Labour (Kaieteur News, 2015, 8
June). In June 2015 the new government announced a Presidential
Commission and promised to follow up on its recommendations.
An anonymous newspaper contributor was not contradicted in
his statement: ‘It is awell-known fact that, mine owners/managers
deem their workers to be self-employed persons in order to reduce
administrative overheads by not having to pay the employer’s
portion of a contribution which is 8.4% of the worker’s insurable
wages’ (Stabroek News, 2015, 13 July). The writer noted that few of
the hand-to-mouth mining workers register as self-employed
persons under the National Insurance Scheme which would
require them to make a monthly payment at the rate of 12.5% of
their insurable wages. As a result, the families of dead miners
receive neither death nor survivor’s beneﬁts.
Mining insiders did not hold out much hope for the Presidential
Commission onmining accidents. A mineworker who spoke to the
Press on condition of anonymity expressed the view ‘that the
frequency of mining accidents and the attendant loss of life was a
reﬂection of what he described as a “long-standing pattern of
lawlessness and indifference to the value of human life” that
obtains in the sector . . . The problems start with corruption and
the fact that the government can’t seem to enforce rules. The places
where we mine gold are far away from Georgetown and when you
are in those places you are on your own. You do as you like. The
boss makes the decision and the people take the risks. It’s how we
make a living.’ According to the miner the absence of controls and
adherence to regulations is somemining operations had to dowith
a culture of corruption that causes mining ofﬁcials to “turn the
other way” as far as ensuring that the regulations are adhered to.
‘It’s the gold and the money that talks’ (Stabroek News, 2015, 14
August).
10. Economic importance of gold mining – changes over time
Gold mining was in its heyday in two periods: between 1884
and 1914 and from2005 to the present (2015). In both periods, gold
production and export made up a sizable part of the economy. In
the peak years of the ﬁrst period – from 1884 to the turn of the
century – gold production increased from 6518 troy ounces in
1886–134,124 troy ounces in 1892, and indeed during a six-year
period (1884–1900), over one and a quarter million troy ounces of
gold were produced. By the turn of the century, gold exports made
up 22 per cent of colonial exports.10 In the second period, from
around 2000, Guyana’s economy became increasingly dependent
on the proceeds of gold mining (Clifford 2011, p. 355). Lucas (2015)
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exchange for Guyana. Its foreign receipts dwarf those of sugar, rice,
timber, ﬁsheries and bauxite, the other major exports of Guyana’
(2015).
Goldmining is the classic boom and bust industry, responsive to
rises in the price of gold in times of global economic insecurity
when gold is seen as a safer investment than stocks, bonds or
currency. Declared output from gold mining tracked in tandem
with the international gold price to a high of US$ 1668 in 2012 on
the London bullionmarket which averaged US $638 between 2000
and 2011, rising from US $273 in 2000 to US$ 1652 in 2011; see
Fig. 1.
The Guyana Gold Board Act (cap. 66:01of 1981, sections 6–10)
stipulated that all gold produced by localminers had to be declared
and sold to the Guyana Gold Board (GGB). In 1994, the Guyana Gold
Board (Amendment) Act removed the monopoly of the GGB as the
sole purchaser of gold, providing an option for production fromany
kind of mining operation to be sold to licensed gold buyers or
dealers. The extent of under-declaration (see Section 11) suggests
that this legal requirement is widely ignored. Walrond et al. found
that ‘a cursory examination of the declaration by producers/
declarers of gold and diamonds demonstrate absolutely no
correlation between large claim holding and production/declara-
tion’ (2015, p. 7).
The GGMC does not publish data on gold produced by
individual holders of small- and medium-scale concession holders
and/or by the rentees on those concessions. TheMining Act 1989 is
not explicit about production records, although Mining Regulation
181(1) appears to require the keeping of daily records. The only
ofﬁcial record of aggregate gold production is issued by the GGB. It
is not clear that the GGB ﬁgures include the gold purchased by the
licensed gold buyers. As the GGMC’s presence is thin on the ground
in all Mining Districts it seems unlikely that the Commission can
corroborate the miners’ declarations with sales to the GGB and to
licensed dealers.
A comparison of the statistics for gold production and gold
exports in Bank of Guyana annual reports show large positive
differences in the late 1990s, suggesting either hoarding of
production or undeclared exports. However, from 2000, there
are no signiﬁcant discrepancies between gold production and
exports, thus suggesting that the acknowledged illegal under-
declaration of production and smuggling was taking place in the
under-ground economy.
National elections in May 2015 ushered in a coalition
government after 22 years of uninterrupted PPP rule. Declarations
of gold production had peaked in 2012 and the new government
announced that it would crack down on ‘rampant’ gold smuggling
(Stabroek News, 2015, 27 August), estimated to be as much as[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]
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Fig. 1. Artisanal gold production and GGB purchases, 1990–2010.
Sources: Bank of Guyana Annual Reports; Bureau of Statistics Annual Reports;
Guyana Gold Board Note: Koz = ‘000 troy ounces.15,000 ounces per week’ (Guyana Ministry of Finance, 2015, p. 7).
The Minister of Finance repeated this estimate in his 2016 Budget
speech (Jordan 2016 [326_TD$DIFF]). The Guyana Gold and Diamonds Miners
Association (GGDMA) protested the government’s claim but
without offering any evidence to the contrary (Stabroek News
2016a [327_TD$DIFF]).
Access to valuable tax concessions such as duty-free fuel is in
theory restricted to miners who have some declared gold
production and are tax compliant. Fig. 1 shows a close correspon-
dence between the ofﬁcial data on artisanal gold production
between 1990 and 2010 and GGB purchases. The persistent
acknowledgments of undeclared gold production made by
Government ofﬁcials and others (AP, 2012; Gildarie 2012; Guyana
Times 2014; Jordan 2016 [328_TD$DIFF]), and the repeated assertions that at least
half of the gold produced is never declared in the published
production ﬁgures have been conﬁrmed by US authorities (see
Section 11). There would be further conﬁrmation of large-scale
gold smuggling in a forensic audit of the GGB done in 2015 (Ram
and McRae 2016; Stabroek News, 2016b, April 28).
In practice, until the change of government in 2015, favoured
miners were allegedly being granted duty free concessions in spite
of being in tax arrears (Stabroek News, 2015, December 4). In its
2015 Budget, the Government announced some additional
concessions for miners but linked them to evidence of tax
compliance. Unsurprisingly the GGDMA said it was in negotiation
with the Government including on the issue of ‘negotiating an
amnesty for those miners who are not tax-compliant’ (Stabroek
News, 2015, 19 October).
Fig. 2 shows that gold exports as a percentage of GDP per
annum averaged 9 per cent in the 1990s, 11 per cent in the ﬁrst
decade of the 21st century and 20 per cent during the years 2010–
2014. Note that only in the three years 2011–2013 have declared
gold exports exceeded the long-term average 9–16 per cent of GDP
since 1993. Given past trends, it is likely that gold production from
small- and medium-scale mining will continue to ﬂuctuate in
tandem with the international gold price.
The importance of the sector lies in its multiplier effects. Gold
workers at all levels earnwages that are among the highest paid in
Guyana. Both Thomas and Clifford estimated that over 90,000
persons or an estimated 12–14 per cent of the population (750,000
in the 2012 census) were directly or indirectly dependent on the
gold and diamondmining industries (Thomas, 2009, p. 13; Clifford
2011, p. 356). The gold fever enabled the GGDMA, the representa-
tive of mining concession holders, to successfully resist any
changes in policies or procedures that appeared to restrict their
personal interests. For example, the (ab)use of mercury has not
slowed (Legg et al., 2015) and furthermore, concession holders[(Fig._2)TD$FIG]
Fig. 2. Artisanal gold production as% GDP, 1990  2014.
Sources: Bank of Guyana Annual Reports; Bureau of Statistics Annual Reports;
Guyana Gold Board Note: Koz = ‘000 troy ounces.
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examine and test mercury-free gold mining equipment” (Stabroek
News, 2015, 11 January). It is the State, as ultimate owner of public
lands and in conformity with its obligations since 2014 under the
Minamata Convention, which has to enforce a move towards
mercury-free mining.
11. Losses to the exchequer
The losses to the Nation State can be grouped into ﬁnancial,
social and environmental categories. We restrict our review to the
ﬁnancial losses only in this article.
11.1. Financial losses
Citizens of gold-producing countries expect their governments
tomonitor production and trade so as to capture themaximumnet
social beneﬁt for State coffers from a mineral which is a wasting
asset and whose production is linked to negative environmental
and social externalities. In the absence of publicly collected and
available data, the losses to the State from the lawless gold mining
sector can only be inferred. State ofﬁcials have admitted informally
to the loss of revenue from undeclared gold smuggled; the lack of
action can be attributed to political patronage. In 2005, a Harvard
teamwere told by GGMC ofﬁcials that as much as an estimated 30
per cent to 80 per cent of undeclared gold (then estimated at US
$200 million) were smuggled out annually without being taxed
(Harvard Law School, 2007, p. 32). “AnantiramBalram, theﬁnancial
ofﬁcer of the Guyana Gold Board (GGB) estimated that only two-
thirds of gold mined in Guyana was sold through the GGB . . .
Balram also pointed out that a high number of the miners selling
their gold to the GGB are unregistered as a consequence of the high
levels of illegal mining taking place in Guyana” (interview on 12
January 2005) (Harvard Law School, 2007, p. 33). Ten months later,
‘Robeson Benn, Commissioner of the GGMC, estimated that miners
produced three times as much gold as they declared’ (interview on
25 October 2005) (Harvard Law School, 2007, p. 22, note 149).
Some evidence of how the systemworked emerged from events
outside the control of the Guyana Government. In this section we
present three additional instances of ﬁnancial losses to the State:
(i) payments made by two foreign companies to holders of Mining
Permits Medium Scale (MPMS); (ii) the Curaçao gold heist in
November 2012 and (iii) the US Government’s exposure of a gold
smuggling ring in August 2015.
11.2. Payments to holders of mining permits medium scale made by
foreign companies
Mining Permits Medium Scale (MPMS), legally held by
Guyanese only but with joint ventures with foreign entities
allowed, increased from 373 in 2007–2904 in 2015 (Table 2).
MPMS, like small-scale claim licences, are prized commodities for
the Guyanese rentier class. Gavin Bridge, who had access to GGMC
ﬁles, conﬁrmed the scale of private wealth transfers from the early
1990s: ‘Records of ﬁrms that began operating in Guyana during the
early 1990s, for example, suggest that the holders of mineral rights
could be paid betweenUS $3000 and US $4000 per permit for their
role in putting up the land as part of a joint venture, with royalty
agreements capable of earning the holders tens of thousands or
even hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars per year’ (2007, p. 84).
Appendix A details the payments in cash (US $1,565,000),
common shares (US $426,687) and purchase warrants (US
$104,420) made to Wayne Vieira, ‘under option’ for 4 medium
scale Mining Permits, by Canadian-owned StrataGold Guyana Inc.
over a seven year period (2004–2011) (Boyle 2011). The maximum
size of amedium scale permit is 486ha (Table 1) so atmost Vieira’sfour permits covered 1944ha or 0.05 per cent of the total area
allocated to medium scale concessions in [329_TD$DIFF] 008. This information
only came into the public domain after Vieira sued StrataGold
Guyana Inc. when they applied to the GGMC for the option to
acquire the Mining Permits.
Walrond himself was the rentier in a similar deal which came
to light in 2010. Canadian mining company, Shoreham, agreed
‘over a ﬁve-year period the principals [Messrs Grantley Walrond
and Lumumba] of [MPMS] Mariwawill be paid an aggregate of US
$1 million and will issue an aggregate of 1.5 million common
shares’ (Stabroek News, 2010, 7 April). The newspaper account
detailed a range of other payments for the 4000ha MPMS. The
then President of Guyana, Jagdeo, admitted that he had instructed
that the MPMS be issued, even though he did not have any
authority in law to do so. Before his partnership with Lumumba, a
Presidential Advisor, Walrond, a former GGMC Commissioner,
had owed US $25,000 in unpaid concession fees on Mariwa
(Stabroek News, 2010, 26 April).
Even if only a fraction of the MPMS holders were able to
leverage ﬁnancial payments on the scale of Vieira, Lumumba and
Walrond, the sums provide an indication of the wealth transfers to
individuals who enjoyed de facto privatize beneﬁts from publicly
owned lands.
11.3. The [330_TD$DIFF]Curaçao gold heist in November 2012
On 30 November 2012, the crew of a ﬁshing boat, the ‘Summer
Bliss’ which had just docked in Curaçao from Guyana was held at
gunpoint and relieved of 70 gold bars [weighing 476 pounds]worth
an estimated US $11.5 million. It took the Guyana Press to calculate
that ‘If the gold was smuggled out of Guyana, the country has lost
US $805,000 based on the ﬁve percent royalty and two percent tax’
(Chabrol, 2012). The Government of Guyana made no attempt to
pursue the matter in the 2.5 years up to the change of government
in May 2015.
At ﬁrst, Guyana’s Minister of Natural Resources and the
Environment maintained that ‘stolen Curaçao gold didn’t originate
here . . . as there is no paperwork to suggest it left these shores’
(Stabroek News, 2012a, 8 December). However, a crewmember
reportedly told investigators in Curacao that the boat had departed
Guyana four days prior to the robbery (Kaieteur News, 2012, 29
December).
Corroboration of the likelihood of Guyana Government
involvement in or knowledge of the heist was furnished by the
actions of the Curaçao and US authorities who ignored the former
in the investigations mounted. The GGMC Commissioner was
reported by Stabroek News as ‘saying that persons on the Dutch
island were not cooperative. “Our people are still working on the
report. People in Curaçao were not cooperating with our people.
They never spokewith the crewmembers; all the information they
got is on the robbery,” he said’ (Stabroek News, 2012, 29
December).
The Curaçao and US authorities probed a pattern of Guyanese
raw gold smuggled from Guyana, laundered in Curaçao and then
shipped to theUSA: ‘ . . . reports have surfaced of a dossier on illicit
shipments fromGuyana for the last 15 years’ (StabroekNews, 2013,
3 February). The boat crew were placed under witness protection
(Stabroek News, 2013, 26 May).
Informed sources in Guyana were in no doubt that the Curaçao
and US authorities offered witness protection to the smugglers:
‘According to a security source, from all indications local
authorities know the identities of those behind the Curaçao gold
but aremaking little effort to investigate them. Stabroek Newswas
told that gold smuggling is a business that has been going on for
years and had it not been for the heist its extent probably would
not have been exposed’ (Stabroek News, 2012, 8 December).
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2015
In late August 2015, Guyanese and US authorities released some
details of a money laundering and gold smuggling racket that had
ﬂeeced the country of more than US $200 million between
November 2014 to March 2015. The smugglers were moving gold
through the country’s airports to the USA and Brazil.
The head of the Special Organised Crime Unit (SOCU) told the
Press ‘there is evidence of a large-scale network involving several
locally-registered mining companies in the smuggling of gold out
through the country’smajor ports. “Based on information gathered
we suspect a number ofmajor networks/individuals are engaged in
this practice . . . there are hundreds of people . . . some are well-
established businesses licensed to export gold,” he said’ (Stabroek
News, 2015, 3 September). The investigationswere still on-going in
October 2015.
12. Policy recommendations
Even in the absence of an overall national policy on mining
(Thomas, 2009, p. 32) it seems clear that the successive versions of
the mining legislation did not envisage the massive accumulation
of claim licences for small-scale mining by a small number of
individuals. Guyana has committed to revise legislation for mining
and forestry, in the strategy for the Ministry of Natural Resources
and the Environment (GLSC, 2013). The rentier mentality is too
deeply embedded in the business life of Guyana to be swept away
simply by legislation. However, the economic, environmental and
social damage and poor governance caused by the current rentier
practices in mining could be reduced by:
12.1. Rentier responsibility
Rentier responsibility making the mining licence holder legally
responsible for acts of commission and omission in every licenced
mine. Thus the licence holder, not the contractor or tributor, would
be responsible for implementing the environmental mining
regulations, including soil and water management, health and
safety requirements, and post-mining site restoration.
12.2. FPIC
Free, Prior And Informed Consent – an obligation with respect
to the nine Amerindian Peoples which was acquired by the
Government of Guyana when it endorsed the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in September
2007. FPIC is stated as a national policy in the second version of
former President Jagdeo’s Low Carbon Development Strategy
(Guyana Ofﬁce of the President, 2009, p. 59) although only the
Members of Parliament of the governing Party approved the LCDS
in the National Assembly. UNDRIP 2007 is only the latest of a series
of assurances by which Amerindian communities can prevent
unwanted mining in their titled and customary territories: the guarantee of land titling in annex C, section L, of the
Independence Agreement with the United Kingdom in 1965
(Letwiniuk, 1996, p. 50–51); the preamble to the Amerindian Lands Commission Act (cap.
59:03, 1966); section 111 in theMining Act 1989–the ‘quiet enjoyment’ clause;
 the preamble and articles 149 (G) of the National Constitution
(cap.01:01, 1980/2003); sections 48–53 of the Amerindian Act (cap. 29:01, 2006).
However, section 50 allows the Minister to override a Village
refusal on the grounds of ‘public interest’, although neither thisAct nor any other legislation contains a test for what is the public
interest. Other safeguards of unspeciﬁed Amerindian rights are in the
Regulations (1974) to the State Lands Act (cap. 62:01,1972) and in
the Forests Act cap. 67:01, 2009, section 5 (2) (e). Insistence by Amerindians on the consistent application of FPIC
in dealings with government agencies, miners and the courts of
justice would need to be paralleled by training of judges and
lawyers as well as of the Ministry of Indigenous Peoples’ Affairs
(formerly the Ministry of Amerindian Affairs before 2015), who
have not shown in the last ﬁve years that they understand Native
Title or the rights that ﬂow from such title. Amerindians
negotiating co-management rights from Native Title over
customary and titled lands would be consistent with the
implementation of the national policy of integrated land use
planning, as proposed in the strategic plan for the Ministry of
Natural Resources and the Environment (GLSC, 2013).
12.3. Sovereign wealth fund
gold and other minerals as non-renewable resources which are
public assets are valued ﬁscally only in terms of the primitive levy
of royalty. It is arbitrary that a royalty of currently 5% is levied on
the gold declared and sold to the Guyana Gold Board, the sole
authorised buyer, by miners or by gold dealers in the hinterland
who are licensed by the Gold Board. The sale price is set at the
London bullion market rate which is ﬁxed twice a day. The sale
price in Guyana apparently assumes bullion-grade purity, 99.5 per
cent. The 5 per cent rate applies when the gold price is above US$
285 per Troy ounce.
In addition a tax of 2 per cent is levied on the gold sale price in
lieu of income tax for small- and medium-scale miners.
Corporations pay 35 per cent on taxable income. In November
2014, miners were claiming that the break-even price was US$
1400/ounce. If miners can show a tax identiﬁcation number (TIN)
and that their taxes are paid up to date, they may be eligible for a
variety of ﬁscal concessions through the government investment
agency GO-Invest (http://goinvest.gov.gy/sectors/mining/). When
the gold price is signiﬁcantly higher than the break-evenprice, as it
was during 2011–2013, the excess proﬁt is captured almost entirely
by theminers and the landlord rentiers (who demand traditionally
a tribute of around 10 per cent paid in raw gold and enforced by
armed ‘rangers’). Brazilian miners working in Guyana, allegedly
oftenwithoutwork permits, may be charged around 20 per cent by
the rentiers.
An excess proﬁt of some US$ 200/ounce was being obtained
during the three years 2011–2013 of high gold prices. The
Government could have taken the opportunity to conﬁgure a
sovereign wealth fund from an extra tax on excess proﬁts. In this
case, taking a conventional 50/50 split of the excess proﬁt, a
sovereign wealth levy could have raised 50 per cent of US$ 200/
ounce1.3 million Troy ounces =US$ 128 million. And this is not
counting the 15,000 ounces per week which the Government has
estimated is smuggled out of Guyana (Section 5 above).
12.4. Preventing insider trading
the current (late 2015/early 2016) forensic audit of the GGMC,
together with Walrond et al.’s management and systems review of
the GGMC in late 2014/early 2015 showhow the restriction ofwhat
should be public information has encouraged the growth of insider
trading. Restriction on public information was typical of the
centralist approach to government of the previous PPP/C political
administration. Implementation of article 146 of the National
Constitution 1980/2003–the citizens’ right to information about
Boy
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of areas opened for small- and medium-scale artisanal mining
would have been fully publicised, allowing open and equitable
auctioning of such areas.
[332_TD$DIFF]Appendix A.
Summary of payments made to Wayne Vieira by StrataGold
Guyana Inc. (2005–2011, US $).
Source: Boyle (2011).
Date ItemBul
cash
payments10-Jun-04 on signing the agreement 150,000
BulDec-04 six months from the signing date of the
agreement
150,000Bul05-Jun 12 months from the signing date of the
agreement150,000Dec-05
Bul18 months from the signing date of the
agreement150,000Jun-06Bul24 months from the signing date of the
agreement150,00004-Jul-07Bulon signing of the Amendment to the
Agreement250,000Jul-08 12 months from the Amendment to the
Agreement250,000CI-C26-Mar-09 on signing of the Amendment to the
Agreement27,0001 April-31 December
2009$6000/month 54,000Cha
1 January-31
December 2010$6000/month 72,0001 January-31 July 2011 $6000/month 72,000
31-Aug-11 cash payment 90,000ClifTotal 1,565,000Col
ColPayments in common shares10-Jun-
04on signing the agreement – 300,000 common shares
issued61,50005-Jun
Dal12 months from the signing date – 250,000 common
shares issued82,629DooJun-06 24 months from the signing date – 150,000 common
shares issued219,935For
04-Jul-
0736 months from the signing date – 100,000 common
shares issued62,623For
ForTotal 426,687ForPayments in purchase warrantsFor
10-Jun-
04on signing the agreement – 200,000 share purchase
warrants issued25,92005-Jun 12 months from the signing date – 100,000 share purchase
warrants issued18,700[344_TD$DIFF]AmJun-06 24 months from the signing date – 100,000 share purchase
warrants issued59,800GasTotal 104,420GGMGGM
GGM
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